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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper intends to analyse the default risk in micro, small and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs) and its relation to new debt opportunities, debt overhang theory and growth 
intention. The results confirm that cash flow, capacity and leverage are the major 
determinants of firms’ default, while gross margin and efficiency measure are not 
significant predictors. By analysing the rating transition behaviour, we found that the 
further the rating migrates, the smaller the probability of transition and that the 
probability towards default is greater along with the decreased quality rating. By 
extending the analysis, we found that the debt overhang theory is not applied in 
relationships between banks and MSMEs.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
In Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries, the percentage of Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) of total firms in 
the economy is greater than 75% (Altman & Sabato, 2007). This is also the case 
for emerging countries, such as Indonesia, where micro, small and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs) are considered to be the backbone of the economy 
(Gunawidjaja & Hermanto, 2010). We use the term MSME instead of SME in 
order to include micro-sized enterprises. In Indonesia, micro-sized enterprises 
outnumber small and medium-sized enterprises (Center of Statistics Bureau, 
2008), therefore constituting most of this sector. The role of MSMEs in the 
economy is expected to become even more significant in the future, as it gained 
considerable attention in the New Basel Capital Accord (Altman & Sabato, 
2007).  
 
Imam Wahyudi 
96 
MSMEs not only present a potential market for banks, but they also bring 
a different kind of risk treatment. For example, the financial information of 
MSMEs, unlike corporate financial information, is considered to be less reliable 
because reports are usually unaudited (Gunawidjaja & Hermanto, 2010). 
Theoretically, this situation is called information opacity (Hyytinen & Pajarinen, 
2008). Other factors causing information opacity are a firm’s young age, small-
collateralised assets, low technology exposure, and insufficient track record to 
manage the business (Bartels, 2002). 
 
Information opacity increases the probability of asymmetric information, 
which causes banks to be more reluctant to fund MSMEs (Akerlof, 1970). 
Asymmetric information serves as a bank’s rationale in implementing credit 
rationing (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Thus, banks will ask a higher return to 
compensate for the increasing likelihood of default due to adverse selection. 
Imperfect information may also lead the bank to experience adverse selection, 
especially of MSMEs. To minimise this risk, Bester (1985) suggested using 
effective screening tools to differentiate clients that will be defaulted or 
prospectively defaulted after the bank approves their proposal. The problems of 
information opacity in MSMEs are present not only in the screening process but 
also in the overall financing period (Figure 1).  
 
Data extracted from Indonesian Banking Statistics (SPI). Macroeconomic 
data such as inflation, exchange rates and domestic loan rates are obtained from 
Indonesian Economic and Financial Statistics (SEKI). These reports were 
published by Bank Indonesia (retrieved at www.bi.go.id). The changes in 
subsidised oil prices, which are gasoline, kerosene and diesel fuel, were gathered 
from the Indonesian Ministry of Energy (retrieved at www.esdm.go.id/). 
 
Another challenge is the situation in which an MSME’s individual 
financing is nominally small but large in number. This condition is often called 
granularity (Srinivas, 2005), which leads to high monitoring costs for the bank 
and potentially decreases the bank’s efficiency in the operation. Therefore, the 
bank requires a tool to monitor MSMEs efficiently (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).  
 
The problem of adverse selection and granularity could cause a bank to 
restrict its funding to MSMEs. Nevertheless, MSMEs are one of the main pillars 
of economic development, especially in creating economic growth and 
employment. Observing the employment level and its contribution to the 
economy, the number of MSMEs in 2008 reached 43.46 million firms (99% of 
total firms in Indonesia), and MSMEs absorbed approximately 79.01 million 
workers (99.40% of the total labour force) and contributed to approximately 
56.70% of the gross domestic product (Center of Statistics Bureau, 2008). Their 
unique traits enable MSMEs to be more flexible and adaptable to the dynamics 
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of market demand (World Bank, 2005; Srinivas, 2005; Altman & Sabato, 2007). 
However, due to both problems (i.e., adverse selection and granularity), banks 
tend to be discouraged in funding MSMEs despite persistent encouragement 
from the central bank (see Table 1).  
 
Selection and monitoring systems need information related to the 
determinants of MSMEs’ default. These determinants have been analysed by 
researchers such as Edmister (1972), Dietsch and Petey (2002, 2004), Lehmann 
(2003), Behr, Guttler, and Plattner (2004), Lopez (2006), Altman and Sabato 
(2007), Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, and Liu (2008), Altman, Sabato, and Wilson 
(2010), Rikkers and Thibeault (2011), and Gama and Geraldes (2012). Early 
studies focused only on examining financial ratios (Edmister, 1972). In the 
2000s, researchers added soft information as qualitative variables, such as banks’ 
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Figure 1. Banks’ channelling schemes and potential problems 
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relationships with debtors (Lehmann, 2003), credit history (Behr et al., 2004; 
Altman et al., 2010), a firm’s type of legal entities (Behr et al., 2004), credit 
structures and entrepreneurs’ profiles (Lopez, 2006). Nevertheless, all of those 
studies only observe the impact and significance of the default predictor and do 
not extend their research by incorporating MSMEs’ unique behaviour as well as 
banks’ distinctive treatment of MSMEs. For example, we found the total debts in 
several MSMEs to be bigger than their total assets, but they are still given new 
credits or credit extension from their banks. Another example is that when its 
gross profits are low, an MSME extends its investment into the future, which is 
unlikely for a corporation.  
 
To analyse the determinants of default by MSMEs, we try to extract 
valuable information from unaudited financial statements. To reduce the effect of 
manipulation in financial statements, we use non-operating expenses to measure 
financial performance, such as gross profit, fixed assets, total debt and operating 
cash flow. A firm’s growth will be calculated based on the fundamental 
assumption that an MSME should reinvest all of its earnings. Therefore, MSMEs 
that were proven to take portions of their earnings for owners’ personal use will 
be excluded from the model. In the first stage, we will use a Logit model to 
examine significant factors affecting MSMEs’ occurrence of default. Factors 
presumed to be default determinants are gross margin, inefficient operation, 
potential growth and cash flow from operation. Then, these findings are validated 
with an instantaneous hazard rate model. The hazard model is applied to evaluate 
the accuracy and validity of a bank’s internal rating system, with an additional 
role of providing effective and efficient monitoring tools. The hazard model gives 
another advantage of calculating the probability of default for the purpose of 
assessing the additional capital that is required by regulators. 
 
In the next stage, we will confirm various relationships that cannot be 
explained by classical corporate finance theory. We will estimate the model to 
observe the impact of leverage and investment in MSMEs’ performance. Usually, 
an increase in leverage should respond positively to the increase in future 
operating cash flow (Ross, 1977; Ravid & Sarig, 1991; Shenoy & Koch, 1996). 
However, the increase in leverage is seen as a positive signal of the growth of 
future cash flows. Whenever the cash flow in the next period does not change or 
even decreases, the signal is not proven. If the firm were a public firm, its stock 
price would fall (Battacharya, 1979; Allen & Faulhaber, 1989).  
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Then, to analyse why banks still intend to give new credit or credit 
extensions despite an MSME having total debts greater than its total assets, we 
will use the theory of debt overhang (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Tirole, 2006) to 
explain this phenomenon. In addition, the factors of entrepreneurs (which are risk 
acceptance and obsession after a positive net present value [NPV] project), firm 
growth and financial distress will be analysed. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) 
 
There are several definitions of MSME businesses. Based on the Regulation of 
Ministry of Finance no. 571/KMK 03/2003, a small enterprise is a business that 
has a yearly gross revenue not more than Rp. 600 million. Based on Government 
Regulation no. 10/1999, a medium business is business with a net wealth ranging 
between Rp. 200 million to Rp. 10 billion. According to UU no. 20/2008, micro, 
small and medium enterprises are defined as in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Definition of micro, small and medium enterprises 
 
Category of business 
Net worth (excluded land and 
building used to business) 
Annual revenue 
Micro enterprise Maximum Rp. 50 million Maximum Rp. 300 million 
Small enterprise Rp. 50 million – Rp. 500 million Rp. 300 million – Rp. 2.50 billion 
Medium enterprise Rp. 500 million – Rp. 10 billion Rp. 2.50 billion – Rp. 50 billion 
Note: The criteria of these nominal values could be changed in accordance with the economy’s development 
and would be regulated by President’s Decree. 
 
 
In Indonesia, MSMEs have significant roles in the economy. Since the 
World Bank referred to 2005 as the International Microcredit Year, the 
microcredit sector in Indonesia has been skyrocketing. From total financing of 
Rp. 716,792 billion in July 2006, direct financing of MSMEs has accounted for at 
least Rp. 377,224 billion, except in channelling programs and credit cards (Bank 
Indonesia, 2007). Boosts in microfinance enable MSMEs to access external 
capital from microloans.  
 
MSMEs have proven their resilience to crises. The simple form enables 
MSMEs to quickly alter their business terms based on the dynamics of the 
economy (Altman & Sabato, 2007; Srinivas, 2005). Resilience to crises was 
shown by the non-performing loan (NPL) indicator, where the NPL of corporate 
financing is higher compared with that of MSMEs (Bank Indonesia, 2007). At 
least two factors affect the resilience of MSMEs to market shocks. First, the 
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business of MSMEs is more diversified, which leads to lower risk in an MSME’s 
financing portfolio. Second, profit margins of MSMEs are usually higher than 
corporate profit margins, implying a better repaying ability. Statistically, MSMEs 
proved to be able to survive during the Indonesian financial crisis of 1997–1998. 
During that time, many banks diverted their funding strategies from targeting the 
corporate segment to MSMEs (see Tables 1 and 2).  
 
Table 1 summarises the credit channelling by MSMEs from Indonesian 
banks during 2000–2011 along with macroeconomic data such as inflation, 
exchange rate, and domestic loan rates as well as changes in subsidised oil prices. 
In 2005, many fundamental changes occurred in the market such as a doubling of 
the domestic fuel price, a high volatility of the exchange rate and high inflation. 
The changes of subsidised oil prices are highlighted because they indicate the 
increase in the overall fuel cost. That year was a difficult period for business 
activities, including banking. Despite this, the credit absorption capacity of 
MSME remains good and higher than the previous period, which was               
Rp. 354,908 billion (see Tables 1 and 2). 
 
Factors Affecting an MSME’s Credit Risk 
 
Debt overhang theory, credit rationing and credit risk 
 
Debt overhang (or being over debt capacity) often serves as a rationale for banks 
to implement credit rationing (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Firms experience debt 
overhang when they are unable to raise new financing for a profitable project 
(Tirole, 2006). This happens when future income and current fixed assets have 
been forfeited, and the firm cannot obtain "debt forgiveness" from existing 
creditors. Under this condition, a bank will not add credit, even if firms are 
willing to pay higher rates (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Tirole, 2006). Moreover, an 
increase in leverage will be followed by default risk (Cai & Zhang, 2011; 
Dimitrov & Jain, 2008). Because they are limited in terms of adding new debt, 
firms with high leverage will have a reduced ability to take positive NPV 
investment projects in the future (Mura & Marchisa, 2010; Cai & Zhang, 2011). 
Thus, leverage will have a negative impact on future investment and growth 
(Aivazian, Ge, & Qiu, 2005). Further, Tirole (2006) explained that debt overhang 
occurs when firms cannot raise new debts for a profitable project if they have 
already committed future income linked to existing assets and if they cannot 
renegotiate some “debt forgiveness” or more generally “claim forgiveness” or 
“claim dilution” with initial investors/creditors. 
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Firm growth, investment and profitability 
 
Along with pecking order theory, Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) found a negative 
relationship between leverage and growth in large and established manufacturing 
firms. Positive earnings growth will generate higher cash flows in the future. 
Because debt is the residual function of internal funds, having a larger cash flow 
available leads to a smaller portion of leverage needed for investment. On the 
other hand, debt is often used as an effective tool to reduce the moral hazard from 
managers in wasting free cash flow and overinvesting in risky projects. 
Therefore, leverage will obstruct a firm’s future growth (Lang et al., 1996). A 
firm’s ability to attain potential projects could be decreased (Mura & Marchisa, 
2010). A negative cash flow relationship between leverage and investment was 
also found by Aivazian et al. (2005). The negative relationship is likely to emerge 
when managers lower leverage in anticipating future investment, and vice versa 
(Aivazian et al., 2005). In contrast, higher leverage will cause higher firm 
profitability. Managers are more controlled in utilising cash flow and choosing 
projects with positive NPV. Investment decisions by managers will be 
constrained by the availability of free cash flow, such as pre-commitment to pay 
principal and interest. As an addition, high leverage is also positively correlated 
with tax benefits and more cash flow available. However, the negative effect of 
leverage on growth disappears with the sophistication of the agency control 
mechanism (such as stock options) to convince external parties that the manager 
is working to maximise the firm’s value (Francis, Hasan, & Sharma, 2011).  
 
Availability of operating cash flow 
 
Operating cash flow is the measure of an entrepreneur’s ability and experience in 
managing a business. In financial management, it is renowned that "cash, not 
profits, is king". This statement follows Keown, Martin, Petty and Scott (2005). 
Damodaran (2010) explains two reasons why cash flow is superior to accounting 
earnings in measuring a project’s return. First, accounting problems are related to 
the issue of operating expenses versus capital expenditures, noncash charges, and 
accrual versus cash revenue and expenses. Furthermore, Damodaran (2010) said 
that accounting earnings, especially at the equity level (net income), could be 
manipulated at least for individual periods through the use of creative accounting 
techniques. Second, cash flow is the answer to liquidity problems. Earnings 
cannot be used as a payment for goods and services delivered; all of them require 
cash. Operating cash flow provides various types of information, such as the 
availability of liquid funds for running a business, a firm's ability to meet 
operational expenses, sufficient funds to repay liabilities and an internal fund’s 
adequacy in supporting business expansion. In addition, banks may use the 
increase in operating cash flow as a positive signal for a firm’s success in 
utilising financing funds.  
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Debt capacity, firm size and composition of assets 
 
Fixed assets as a measure of firm size are associated with a firm’s capacity to 
generate revenue and cash flow. Naturally, creditors will analyse a firm’s asset 
composition to foresee their ability to repay debt in the future. When a firm has 
larger tangible fixed assets, they have more available assets to be collateralised. 
A firm’s debt capacity should be in accordance with a firm’s ability to generate 
cash flow and the availability of collateralised assets. Frequently, larger firms 
tend to be more diversified. Therefore, they are more resilient to the 
environmental dynamic risk, which affects their performance. This situation leads 
to larger firms being more difficult to bankrupt, even with high leverage. Myers 
and Majluf (1984) stated that greater intangible assets owned by firm could cause 
greater asymmetric information and a higher cost of equity, which encourages 
increased leverage. Unlike tangible assets, intangible assets do not have markets 
where investors or creditors could compare their prices. Their value is defined 
historically based on cost disbursed, which of course is undisclosed for the 
market. In this case, the debt ratio will be positively correlated with the 
proportion of fixed tangible assets (Shenoy & Koch, 1996). Instead, by selling 
secured debt, a firm can increase the value of equity by taking over the welfare of 
existing unsecured creditors (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). 
 
Leverage, default risk and financial constraints 
 
An increase in leverage is often perceived as a positive signal that a firm is still 
growing and prospective. The profitability of a firm with high leverage will 
increase in the future as long as it runs a project with positive NPV. However, 
Cai and Zhang (2011) found that in several circumstances, returns from the 
project, after fulfilling any debt obligations, are lower than the hurdle rate asked 
by the investor. Furthermore, an increase in leverage will also be followed by 
default risk. A manager that is motivated to use debt will also be barred by 
financial constraints and debt capacity. In financially healthy firms, the increase 
in leverage is still compensated by the rise of the firm’s value (profitability), 
which is higher than the increase in the potential of financial distress and 
bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, in financially constrained firms (such as 
those in high default risk), the increase in leverage will positively affect a firm’s 
likelihood to default (Cai & Zhang, 2011) and negatively affect a firm’s return 
(Dimitrov & Jain, 2008). As an addition, high leverage in the present will 
potentially reduce a firm’s ability to take on prospective projects in the future 
(Mura & Marchisa, 2010). Debt usage is constrained by financial constraints such 
as financial distress, friction in accessing capital markets and the cost of 
bankruptcy risk. The larger the debt ratio, the greater the financial leverage, and 
firms are more sensitive to volatility of operating income (Cai & Zhang, 2011). 
Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder and Poterba (1988) provided evidence that a 
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financing hierarchy is almost always present in firms that are identified as 
financially constrained firms. As leverage increases, debt capacity is reduced, and 
thus, the market will respond negatively to the increase of a firm’s default risk. 
The firm will face funding restrictions (Boyle & Guthrie, 2003; Gatchev, 
Pulvino, & Tarhan, 2010). Moreover, Boyle and Guthrie (2003) stated that 
investment timing would face capital market friction, which will restrict 
investment alternatives. Alti (2003) found that a small and young firm with high 
growth and a low dividend payment ratio tends to have higher investment 
sensitivity to cash flow. Young firms face the uncertainty of future growth, and 
this uncertainty will be answered along with cash flow realisation in which new 
information is provided. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data and Description of Variables 
 
The data used in this study include the financial statements of MSMEs and 
ratings provided through internal rating systems. Financial statement data are 
available annually from 2003 to 2007. Ratings data were obtained on a monthly 
basis from January 2005 to December 2008. There are 2,172 sample firms. After 
treating for missing variables, an unbalanced panel of 5,501 observations from 
2,172 firms and 4 years of a sample period remain for Logit model estimation. 
There are 100,317 observations available from unbalanced panel data from 2,172 
firms and 47 months for hazard model estimation. 
 
Based on the Decree of Directorate of Bank Indonesia no. 
31/147/KEP/DIR/1998, there are five categories of ratings: the L (current), DPK 
(special mention), KL (substandard), D (doubtful) and M (loss). In this decree, 
Bank Indonesia stated that financing is considered defaulted when three 
conditions are met. First, when there is an unpaid sum in principal and/or interest 
and/or other charges for 90 days, even though the productive assets are not 
overdue. Second, when the payment of principal and/or interest and/or other 
charges is not met and the productive assets are overdue. Third, when conditions 
other than the principal and/or interest payment cannot be met. This definition is 
also stated in the regulation of Bank Indonesia no. 7/2/PBI/2005 about a bank’s 
asset quality, especially on article 34(2). The Basel committee on banking 
supervision (2004) categorised a credit as defaulted when (i) a bank takes the 
obligor as unable to pay the credit obligation in full term without legal action, 
such as confiscation, and (ii) when the obligor has passed 90 days from the past 
due loan. In this study, financing is categorised as defaulted when it is in the 
category of M (loss), although it occurred only once in the year. However, in 
practice, not all firms that fall into rating M are actually defaulted. It is likely that 
Imam Wahyudi 
106 
despite the firm currently being in category M, the ratings improve significantly 
in the next period.  
 
In analysing the determinants of an MSME’s default, we utilise several 
variables taken from financial statements, which are the gross profit margin 
(GPM), the ratio of operating expenses to revenues (BOPO), operating cash flow 
(CASHFLOW), and a firm’s capacity (CAPACITY) and leverage (LEVERAGE). 
We prefer to use the gross profit margin as profitability measures compared with 
other accounting metrics such as ROA and ROE. In addition, the gross profit is 
an appropriate proxy for measuring a firm’s ability to obtain safety margins. 
Positive gross profit indicates that the firm is still worth maintaining. Therefore, 
despite being in default rating, as long as it has a positive gross profit, banks may 
restructure or extend the financing period. Meanwhile, the bank expects a firm’s 
operating performance to improve in the future, such as through a tight efficiency 
policy. In contrast, when gross profit is consistently negative over the last three 
years, the financing should be terminated immediately. Capital recovery should 
be made through the liquidation of collateral assets or from a guarantor. 
 
Even if a firm’s gross profit is positive, it does not necessarily mean that 
the firm has a sufficient ability to pay. An adequate margin to restore the bank’s 
capital and sharing return depends on the firm’s efficiency in managing its 
business. In this study, the measure used is the BOPO, where a smaller BOPO 
indicates that a firm is more efficient. CASHFLOW is calculated as [EBIT + 
DEPR – TAX + DLWC]. EBIT is earnings before interest and tax expenses. It is 
also called operating income. DEPR is the sum of depreciation, amortisation and 
depletion expenses. TAX is calculated from the effective tax rate (tax payment 
divided by earnings before tax expenses) multiplied by EBIT. DLWC is the 
decrease in net working capital calculated as: 
 
                   [(CAt–1 – CLt–1) – (CAt – CLt)]                                              (1) 
 
where CA is current assets and CL is current liabilities.  
 
To capture the variation in cash flow among different firm sizes and to avoid bias 
in the estimation model as well as minimise potential problems of 
heteroscedasticity, we will divide CASHFLOW by total assets.  
 
The firm’s CAPACITY is calculated as the proportion of tangible fixed 
assets to total assets. This measure could reveal various significant explanations. 
First is the firm’s capacity to generate current income. Second is the firm’s ability 
to expand and scale up the business’ capacity in the future. Third is financing 
(debt) capacity. Along with an increasing number of collateralised fixed assets, a 
firm’s ability to obtain additional funds through financing will also increase. The 
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bank as a creditor will measure the recovery rate of capital given based on the 
amount of tangible fixed assets that can be collateralised. Lastly, LEVERAGE is 
calculated as the ratio of total debts to total assets. This variable is used to control 
debt capacity as well as to observe the effect of leverage on a firm’s default risk. 
Long-term debt is a part of a firm’s strategy and lies within a strategic area. It is 
different with the short-term liabilities that usually arise spontaneously along 
with a firm’s operating activities. However, the sum of both will be total debts 
that must be paid by the firms and should be at least equal to the liquidation value 
of the firm’s assets. Table 4 summarises the variables used in this research. 
 
Table 4  
Definition of variables and measurement 
 
Variable Proxy Code Measurement 
Profitability Gross profit margin GPM [Revenue – cost of goods 
sold]/revenue 
Efficiency Ratio of operating expenses 
to revenue 
BOPO Operating expenses/ 
revenue 
Liquidity (cash 
availability) 
Operating cash flow CASHFLOW [EBIT + depreciation, 
amortisation and depletion 
expenses – effective tax 
payment + decreasing in 
net working capital]/total 
assets 
Capacity Proportion of tangible fixed 
assets to total assets 
CAPACITY Tangible fixed assets/ total 
assets 
Leverage Debt ratio LTDR Total debt/total assets 
 
 
Model Specification 
 
Logit regression model 
 
This study employs Logit regression models to examine various determinants of 
default in MSME. Logit regression models are established through non-linear 
regression techniques categorised as Limited Dependent Variables Regressions 
(LDV). In this study, the dependent variable is the probability of default or no 
default. One should note that the dependent variable is an observed variable, 
allowing only the probability of 1 or 0. Because there are only two possible 
events, default (1) and no default (0), then the probability of the occurrence of 
default (or no default) follows a binomial distribution. By using metric variables 
as explanatory variables in this study, the Logit regression model specification 
can be written as follows: 
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                                                                       (2)                                   
 
where logit(pi) is natural logarithm of the ratio between the probability that firm i 
experiences default (pi) and the probability that firm i does not experience default 
(1 – pi), where it is linearly related with f(Xi). Xi is a set of explanatory variables, 
which in this model are GPMi, BOPOi, CASHFLOWi, CAPACITYi and 
LEVERAGEi and can be written as follows: 
 
      (3) 
 
where b is constant and e is error terms that is distributed according to a standard 
logistic distribution (e ~ Logistic[0,1]). 
 
By mathematical derivation, the following is obtained: 
 
                                                 
1
1 exp[ ( )]
i
i
p
f X

 
                     (4) 
 
Parameters in f(Xi) cannot be estimated using a least-squares method, as in a 
classical regression, because the Logit model is a non-linear model. To estimate 
the parameters in a Logit model, the maximum likelihood method is a better 
estimator than the least-squares method. 
 
Reduced-form model 
 
When an internal rating system is developed, hazard models as a type of reduced-
form model can be used as an efficient monitoring tool. The transition rating 
model using the parameter hazard rate (λ) has improved over time. It is 
formulated from two theories: the probability theory (Markov chain) and survival 
analysis. Various studies have been conducted to improve the use of the hazard 
model, especially in the credit risk model, such as Aalen and Johansen (1978), 
Andersen, Hansen and Keiding (1991), Kavvathas (2000), Bangia, Diebold, 
Schuermann, Kronimus and Schagen (2002), Lando and Skodeberg (2002), and 
Jafry and Schuermann (2004). This model is divided into two categories: discrete 
time and continuous time. Essentially, the Markov chain framework assumes that 
the matrix transition is constant. In other research, Aalen and Johansen (1978) 
develop the hazard model by assuming that parameter λ is time invariant. This 
model follows a first-order Markov framework. A homogeneous-continuous time 
assumption is used to transform a matrix generator into a rating transition 
probability matrix. A matrix generator is built from the recapitulation of 
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transition ratings during the observation period for each firm. This matrix is 
calculated as: 
 
                                          (5) 
 
where λij  0 for i  j and .ii j i ij     Both conditions are necessary in order 
to ensure that the sum of a row in the generator matrix is one. This reveals that 
the rating transition is single stochastic, in which amount of firms migrating to 
another rating is equal to firms out of the origin rating. 
0
( )
,
( )
ij
ij T
i
N T
Y s ds
 

 where 
λij is the instantaneous hazard rate from state i to state j, Nij(T) is the sum of the 
total transition from state i to state j within period [0,T], and Yi(s) is the sum of 
firms on rating i at time s. 
 
In this study, it is assumed that the rating transition follows an 
exponential distribution, which has a memory-loss property. Using a Laplace 
transformation, a transition matrix is generated as follows: 
 
                              P(t) = exp (t),   t  0                                          (6) 
 
Note that the transition probability pij(t) is for a quarter ahead. The transition 
probability for a year ahead where T = 4t could be calculated by replacing the 
data duration from quarterly to annually. Another method is by converting P(t) to 
P(T = 4t) without incorporating original data. Assuming that the transition 
probability is equal to [P1(t) = P2(t) = P3(t) = P4(t) = P(t)] and independent across 
years and quarters, P(T = 4t) is generated by multiplying the monthly transition 
probability of k-months, Pk(t), in one year (k = 1, 2, 3, 4), written as: 
 
 
4 4
12
( 4 ) ( ) [ ( )]kk
P T t P t P t

                                 (7) 
 
The extension of the hazard rate model 
 
The extension model is used to assess the determinants of the default rate. This 
model was developed by Loffler and Posch (2007). They introduced the model 
from the Poisson distribution and proved that Poisson is the valid approximation 
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of the binomial case (see the Logit model in the section Model Specification). By 
assuming that the transition to default λi varies according to the set of explanatory 
variables through the relations, the following could result: 
 
                    (8) 
 
The exponential function on the right side of the equation assures that the 
expectation of the instantaneous hazard rate toward the default value is always 
non-negative. The equation above can be rewritten as: 
 
                            (9) 
 
 
ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for every firm’s profitability, efficiency, 
cash flow, capacity and debt usage (leverage) over the entire sample. The sample 
includes 2,172 firms with 5 years of data except for CASHFLOW (4 years of 
data were available). Table 5 implies that the data on each firm are highly varied, 
shown by a standard deviation that is similar to the average value. By using the 
ratio to define exogenous variables, we could reduce the variation among firms, 
although not entirely perfectly. Table 6 also indicates the presence of an extreme 
value for each variable by looking at the maximum values. However, the value is 
still reasonable and can be explained by observing the firm’s practice. For 
example, the value of BOPO is 1.603, which implies that general, administrative 
and operational expenses are equal to 1.603 times the firm’s revenue. Perhaps the 
firm’s revenue is very low in that year, but at the same time, operating expenses 
are very large. Similarly, the value of LEVERAGE is 1.866. Firm debt in terms 
of both operating and financing liabilities exceeds its total assets. This output 
indicates that the firm has experienced “debt overhang”. Debt overhang explains 
why a bank would not extend credit or grant a new credit even if the firm were 
willing to pay higher rates and why loan markets are personalised and clear 
through quantities, i.e., credit limits, as well as through prices, i.e., interest rates 
(Tirole, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, we analyse the correlation of explanatory variables to 
detect multicollinearity. Table 6 shows the correlation between exogenous 
variables. All bivariate correlations are below 0.3 (absolute) except the 
correlation between GPM and BOPO (which is 0.686). As described in the 
introduction section, one of the characteristics of MSMEs is their flexibility and 
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speed of adjustment to the market’s dynamics. In the case of corporations, the 
correlation between GPM and BOPO is usually low. It is harder for corporations 
to reduce (or increase) operating expenses when market demand falls (or rises). 
They have been operating at the most efficient level. Large capacity measured in 
terms of total fixed assets, total revenue or the number of employees causes a 
corporation to be more resistant to any changes in the market. Corporations tend 
to focus on their strategic planning and its implementation rather than paying 
attention to short-term dynamics of the environment. In contrast, MSMEs can 
easily add employees or perform subcontracts and outsource to meet the rising 
market demand. When the market is slow, MSMEs can easily reduce the 
operational burden, and in extreme conditions, MSMEs are easily able to change 
their core business. Given that the correlation between GPM and BOPO is under 
0.75, these two variables can still be included in the regression model. Gujarati 
(2004) suggested a rule of thumb that if the pair-wise or zero-order correlation 
coefficient between two regressors is high, for example, more than 0.8, then 
multicollinearity is a serious problem. However, high zero-order correlations are 
a sufficient but not necessary condition for the existence of multicollinearity 
because it can exist even though the zero-order or simple correlations are 
comparatively low (for example, less than 0.50). 
 
The Determinants of Default by MSMEs 
 
The estimation result of the binary Logit regression model is shown in 
Table 7. The dependent variable used is the probability, given the current 
condition, that firm will default (or not) in the next year. This is a binary variable 
that takes a value of 1 when a firm defaults and 0 otherwise. Various numerical 
factors that are assumed to be the determinants of default are: GPM, BOPO, 
CASHFLOW, CAPACITY and LEVERAGE. Given that the correlation between 
GPM and BOPO is relatively high, 0.686 (see Table 6), a robustness test is 
performed to the model specification. The original model includes both variables 
(GPM and BOPO) because the correlation level is still below 0.75. To observe 
the multicollinearity effect, a regression is conducted on the two other models by 
inserting GPM and BOPO one by one. The results showed that robustness in the 
two models does not provide a significant impact on the overall estimation 
results. In addition to GPM and BOPO, all of the variables, namely 
CASHFLOW, CAPACITY and LEVERAGE, significantly affect the tendency of 
firms to default next year. As expected, GPM and BOPO are not major 
determinants of firms’ default. An entrepreneur’s persistence and flexibility in 
managing business enable an MSME to withstand the default risk, despite its 
gross profit margin being negative and the core business being inefficient. 
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Table 5  
Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Notes: The sample includes 2,172 MSMEs in Indonesia from December 2003 to 2007. Data are obtained from 
firms’ annual unaudited financial reports. The summary statistics are the values at the end of fiscal year 2007. 
MSME is defined as a firm with maximum total assets of Rp. 10 billion (see Government regulation no. 
10/1999).  GPM is the gross profit margin calculated as the gross profit divided by total revenue. BOPO is the 
ratio of operating expenses including general, administrative and operational expenses and divided by total 
revenue. CASHFLOW is the operating cash flow calculated as [EBITt + (depreciation, amortisation and 
depletion expenses)t – (effective tax rate × EBIT)t + (CA–CL)t–1 – (CA–CL)t] divided by total assets. 
CAPACITY is the firm’s capacity, calculated as the proportion of tangible fixed assets to total assets. 
LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debts to total assets. Descriptive statistics for each variable are the 
average, median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, minimum, maximum and percentage values.  
 
 
Table 6  
Correlation analysis between variables 
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Table 7 shows that CASHFLOW, CAPACITY and LEVERAGE 
positively and significantly affect the likelihood of a firm to default next year. 
Cash flow availability is required to ensure business sustainability, pay operating 
liabilities, purchase raw materials, increase business capacity or expand business 
into other areas. It is similar with CAPACITY. Firms should have a space to 
grow. Cash flow availability from operations must be supported by the adequacy 
of a fixed asset’s capacity, especially for expansion in the current business. When 
a firm’s capacity is limited, the cash flow generated might be an idle fund, which 
does not increase the firm's profitability and ability to repay financing funds in 
the future. If a firm has larger tangible fixed assets, it has a wider capacity to use 
debt. At least, a firm has adequate assets as collateral that are ready to be 
liquidated when operating cash flow is insufficient to repay its liability to a bank. 
However, it is noteworthy that the greater the leverage, the greater the default 
risk faced by the firm. The firm will bear a high leverage cost, and when it 
exceeds the firm’s ability to generate earnings, it may push the firm to default. 
 
Observing the direction of the regression coefficients, all coefficients 
from the three variables, namely CASHFLOW, CAPACITY and LEVERAGE, 
are positive. This implies that these variables positively influence a firm’s 
probability of default. In corporate finance theory, an increase in leverage will be 
followed by default risk (Dimitrov & Jain, 2008; Cai & Zhang, 2011). 
Furthermore, if a firm is financially healthy, an increase in leverage is offset by 
raising the firm’s value, which is higher than the increase in the probability of 
financial distress and bankruptcy risk. Otherwise, for financially constrained 
firms, an increase in leverage will be followed by a decrease in the stock price or 
firms’ return. Furthermore, high leverage in the present time could reduce a 
firm’s ability to take on prospective projects in the future (Mura & Marchisa, 
2010). 
 
Unlike CASHFLOW and CAPACITY, LEVERAGE should contribute 
positively to default. These two variables should have a negative effect on the 
probability of default. One of the possible explanations of this phenomenon is 
that MSMEs might be mistakenly using an unmatched financing method. 
Nevertheless, Table 7 shows that the results of the regressions vary among 
groups of total assets. T-test statistics on the difference of each coefficient 
variable are significant at 1%, except for CAPACITY (significant at 5%). This 
indicates that the determinants of risk and its behaviour differ for firms based on 
their asset size. Interestingly, bias in this behaviour is present for 3 medium asset 
groups, while the coefficient sign in the 2 smallest asset groups and 5 biggest 
asset groups follow the behaviour of the general sample. Bias in the coefficient 
sign occurred in the GPM, BOPO and LEVERAGE variables, while the 
remaining variables are the same. 
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Rating the Transition Behaviour of MSMEs 
 
The second stage is to examine the rating transition behaviour. The hazard model 
assumes that firms within similar ratings would have identical behaviour and 
probability of rating transitions in the next period. Firms with similar ratings are 
categorised as one cohort. By assuming that their rating movement is not affected 
by their experience of rating movement in the past (i.e., the memory-loss 
property) and independent from one firm to another, the rating transition intensity 
rate Λ(t) is obtained as follows in Table 8. Table 8 (Panel A) explains the 
frequency of firms with each rating within a specified time. The number in each 
cell implies a firm’s transition from the original rating to the destination rating. 
For example, among 78.219 firms that were once rated as L, only 1 firm migrates  
to category M (loss). It also shows that none of the firms had actual defaults, as 
none of the firms migrated from M to NR. All of the firms that fall into the M 
rating remained in M or upgraded in the next period. Table 8 (Panel B) shows the 
average of quarterly rating transitions, revealing that the transitions did not occur 
instantly but shifted gradually from one rating to another, showing that no firm 
has an M rating except for those coming from a D rating. 
 
In Table 8, the sum of a row should equal one to ensure the single 
stochastic condition on rating transition intensity. The number of firms migrating 
to another rating except the original rating should equal the number of firms 
coming from the initial rating. Based on historical data, we found that none of 
firms at rating L and DPK directly descended to rating M (default). Firms from 
these two ratings only downgraded to the nearest rating. This is different for 
firms that are already categorised as default (M). There is empirical evidence that 
they can experience an upgrade directly from M to L or DPK. From a risk 
management perspective, banks should focus on the downgrade behaviour. When 
a financing portfolio tends to downgrade, banks need to immediately evaluate 
and monitor their financing policies regardless of whether the rating downgrade 
is caused by an MSME’s business factors, extreme changes in market conditions, 
or weak selection and monitoring systems that banks applied. 
 
By conducting a Laplace transformation on the matrix generator, we 
obtain the transition probability matrix as shown in Table 8 (Panel C). In contrast 
with Table 8 (Panel B), it was found that p
L,M
  and p
DPK,M
  are positive. However, 
the data show that no firms with rating L and DPK transitioned to M in the 
following month. This indicates that firms gradually shift from L and DPK into 
M in the quarter. For example, a firm that is rated as L dropped to DPK in the 
next month, plunged again to KL in the next month, and finally remains in M at 
the end of the quarter.  
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Table 8 (Panel C) also shows the nature of monotonous behaviour. It 
means that the probability of a firm with a rating L to stay in rating L is 0.929, 
while the probability of a firm with a rating L to migrate to the lower rating of 
DPK is 0.059, which is bigger than the probability of a firm with a rating L to 
move to ratings KL (0.006) and D (0.004). Overall, the further the rating, the 
smaller the probability of transition, for example: p
L,L
(0.929) > p
L,DPK 
(0.059) > 
p
L,KL 
(0.006) > p
L,D 
(0.004) > pL,M (0.001). In addition, the probability of default is 
greater along with the decreased quality rating, i.e., p
M,M
(0.985) > p
D,M 
(0.586) > 
p
KL,M 
(0.342) > p
DPK,M 
(0.042) > p
L,M 
(0.001). This finding supports previous 
results from Kavvathas (2000), Bangia et al. (2002), Lando and Skodeberg 
(2002), and Jafry and Schuermann (2004). 
 
To calculate the additional minimum capital that is required by 
regulators, one needs to measure the transition probability matrix of one year 
ahead. This matrix can be calculated by multiplying the transition probability 
matrix P(t) in Table 8 (Panel C) by itself 4 times. The probability of firms with a 
current rating i to default in the next year is shown in Table 8 (Panel D). 
 
The Extension Model: Determinants of Default Rate Variation Across Time 
 
In the Logit model, information about transition rates and the probability of 
movement in the next quarter is ignored. Likewise, in hazard models, the variety 
of information related to a firm’s performance and individual characteristics is 
also ignored. Therefore, in the extension model used, both the transition rate (λi) 
and various determinants of default (GPM, ROA, CASHFLOW, CAPACITY and 
LEVERAGE) are used together.  
 
The estimation results of the model parameters in equation 9 are shown 
in Table 9. The findings in Table 9 are similar to those in Table 7. CASHFLOW, 
CAPACITY and LEVERAGE positively and significantly affect a firm’s 
transition rate from the “performing” category (i.e., L and DPK) to the “less 
performing” category (i.e., KL, D and M). GPM and BOPO positively and 
insignificantly contribute when included altogether in the model. Both 
significantly contribute when entered separately. Interestingly, both also 
positively affect the firm’s tendency toward default. When GPM and BOPO 
increase, the transition rate towards KL, D and M ratings is accelerated. These 
variables cannot be explained by general corporate finance theory but need to be 
inspected for each individual case, for example, in the case when the BOPO 
coefficient is positive. Positive operating cash flows are used to increase 
capacity. The increase in capacity is responded to negatively by revenue and 
positive operating expenses.  
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Based on Table 9, there are no variations of the coefficient signs of 
various asset groups except for 3 variables: GPM, BOPO and CASHFLOW. 
Nevertheless, Table 9 also shows significant differences in the coefficient values 
of the smallest and biggest assets except CAPACITY. It shows that despite the 
coefficient sign being the same, the impact of factors on a firm’s likelihood of 
default is based on the asset size. 
 
The Impact of Leverage and Investment on an MSME’s Performance 
 
Therefore, in order to explain the impact of leverage and investment on an 
MSME’s performance, the operating cash flow will be regressed on leverage, 
along with GPM, BOPO and CAPACITY. The estimation results of these 
parameters are shown in Table 10.  
 
Table 10 supports prior findings. GPM has a positive and significant 
coefficient when separated from the BOPO. This indicates a positive relationship 
between them, which is gross profit and operating cash flow, and is in line with 
theory in finance. BOPO is also statistically negatively related to operating cash 
flow. Larger gross profit and smaller operating expenses lead to an increase in 
cash flow available from operating activities. Interestingly, the data show a 
negative impact of leverage (LEVERAGE) and investment (CAPACITY) in the 
prior period to the firm’s current performance (CASHFLOW). The increase in 
leverage is not accompanied by an increase in operating cash flow. In the context 
of signalling theory, an increase in leverage should respond positively to the 
increase in operating cash flow in the next period (Ross, 1977; Ravid & Sarig, 
1991; Shenoy & Koch, 1996). However, the increase in leverage is seen as a 
positive signal of the growth in cash flows in the future. Whenever the cash flow 
in the next period does not change or even decreases, the signal is not proven. If 
the firm is a public firm, its stock price would fall (Battacharya, 1979; Allen & 
Faulhaber, 1989).  
 
For a bank as a creditor, this condition should be a negative signal that an 
MSME is not efficient in managing its business. In addition, we found that 
current investment has a negative impact on firm’s performance. Supposedly, 
investment in fixed assets increases business capacity and ultimately increases a 
firm’s operating cash flow. When the impact is negative, it indicates that the firm 
is not prepared to increase its capacity. Increasing revenue insufficiently offsets 
additional operating expenses. As a result, this discrepancy will lower a firm’s 
profitability and availability of operating cash flow. 
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Table 8  
Rating transition analysis 
 
 
 
Notes: There are 100,317 data points from 2,172 firms in 48 months of observation. Left and right censoring is 
applied by adding “not rated” (NR). Panel A shows the frequency of the firms in each rating. Panel B shows the 
matrix generator (Λ). The spontaneous transition rate (λij) is calculated as the average of 16 quarters during the 
period January 2005 – December 2008. The instantaneous hazard rate from state i to state j, λij is defined as 
Nij(T)/(∫0
TYi(s)ds) for i ≠ j and must be λij ≥ 0, where Nij(T) is the total sum of the transition from state i to state j 
within period [0, T], and Yi(s) means the sum of firms with rating i at time s. The λii is defined as –Σj ≠ iλij. These 
two conditions are necessary to ensure that sum of the numbers in a row is one. Panel C shows the probability 
matrix transition one quarter ahead. This matrix, P(t), is calculated using a Laplace transformation: P(t) = 
exp(Λt). Panel D shows the probability of default one year ahead, estimated by P(T)=[P(t)].4 
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Debt Overhang Hypothesis: New Debt and Future Investment Opportunities 
 
To test the impact of debt overhang, we will examine how leverage change 
affects future investment (see also Cai & Zhang, 2011). In this paper, future 
investment will be measured by the investment rate and capital expenditure, 
while R&D expenditure is not used because none of the MSMEs has it. The 
investment rate is calculated as the percentage change in total assets. Capital 
expenditure is calculated as the ratio of delta fixed assets divided by total assets 
of the previous period. We also added a measure of investment, i.e., delta net 
working capital divided by the total assets of the previous period to examine the 
presumptions in Table 7 that the new debt is not used to finance investment but 
working capital. The three measures of future investment will be regressed on 
current leverage increase (DLEV) along with return on equity (ROE), GPM, 
BOPO, CAPACITY and CASHFLOW. However, ROE is often misunderstood 
when total equity and net income are both negative. To control these conditions, 
ROE is only calculated for MSMEs that have positive total equity. 
 
Table 11 reveals several significant pieces of information. It shows that 
ROE affects future investment positively and significantly at 10%. This indicates 
an entrepreneur’s aggressiveness to invest as long as the business returns are 
positive. Interestingly, the GPM actually discourages future investment. The 
same response occurs when the MSME’s operation becomes more efficient. A 
firm does not use this moment to increase its business capacity, but instead, it 
restricts future investment on total assets (Regression 1), fixed assets (Regression 
2) and working capital (Regression 3). The firm will increase future investment 
when the availability of operating cash flow is rising, but only in terms of the net 
working capital (Regression 3) and not fixed assets (Regression 2). This implies 
that the internal funds generated from operating activities tend to be used to 
expand the business scale and not to increase the business capacity. It is 
supported by the negative relationship between current installed capacity and 
future investment. 
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Interestingly, current capacity and leverage negatively (and significantly) 
affect the future investment in fixed assets (Regressions 1 and 2). When installed 
fixed assets as well as current leverage are large, MSMEs tend to limit future 
investment. Higher leverage encourages MSMEs to reduce future investment, 
which is consistent with the findings in Table 7. One of the possible explanations 
for this is that when a firm’s leverage is high, the firm tends to be constrained in 
obtaining additional external funds (via financing facilities/credit) from creditors 
(Tirole, 2006) and the firm's ability to take on favourable projects in the future 
decreases (Mura & Marchisa, 2010; Cai & Zhang, 2011). Firms invest solely in 
net working capital when their leverage is high (Regression 3). This indicates that 
banks tighten policy mechanisms to control MSMEs in using their funds. Firms 
should invest in order to optimise their unutilised capacity through working 
capital. The findings in Table 11 also support this argument, where BOPO 
positively affects future investment in working capital (Regression 3). This 
restriction is reasonably applied, as banks still consider that MSMEs are 
inexperienced in making appropriate capital spending policy. The firms invest in 
total assets when they operate inefficiently (higher BOPO) and unprofitably 
(lower gross margins). On the contrary, when firms operate efficiently and able to 
generate higher gross margin, they reduce future investment. 
 
This result, which is a negative relationship between current leverage and 
future investment in fixed assets, can be explained by the “debt overhang” theory. 
Banks would restrict additional financing to MSME when a firm’s leverage is 
high. Banks consider that firms have reached their limit in terms of their ability to 
receive additional credit/financing. The additional credit/financing would only 
cause the firm’s financial distress. A firm's ability to generate profit is not enough 
to offset the increasing financial expense and only increases the firm’s likelihood 
of default. This condition is revealed in a negative relationship between leverage 
change and future investment (Cai & Zhang, 2011).  
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However, the findings in Table 11 show different results. The DLEV 
coefficient indicates a positive sign, although not significantly, in all three 
regressions. This means that an MSME has yet to experience debt overhang. 
Firms without financial constraints could easily access external funds from 
financial markets (i.e., bonds) or banks (i.e., credit) to finance investment in fixed 
assets (Regression 2) and net working capital (Regression 3). Thus, it can be 
concluded that although a bank implements restrictions on MSMEs in using their 
funds, banks do not apply “credit rationing” on MSMEs when they request 
additional funds to finance their investments. There are several reasons for a bank 
to retain typical firms and keep extending their funding, including the following: 
well-established relationship lending, an entrepreneur as a community leader as a 
bank’s liaison to the community, and that their characters are essentially good 
and credible. Obviously, this must be under strict supervision from the bank in 
order to ensure that the realisation of funding allocation is matched with their 
proposal being approved, either in the case of normal credit/financing or debt 
restructuring. 
 
Leverage Effects: Debt Overhang, Financial Distress and Firm Growth 
 
As discussed earlier, when leverage increases, debt capacity will be reduced, the 
market (investor) or bank will respond negatively to increasing default risk, and 
financially constrained firms will face even more restrictions in future financing 
(Boyle & Guthrie, 2003; Gatchev et al., 2010). This is called debt overhang 
(Tirole, 2006). Debt overhang theory predicts that firms with higher financial 
distress or those facing financial constraints tend to experience debt overhang 
(Cai & Zhang, 2011). 
 
To examine this theory, we first sort and categorise the sample into 5 
groups based on debt usage in capital structure (leverage) at the beginning of the 
year. Then, the samples in each group are ranked based on their measure of 
financial distress, which is firm’s tendency to fall into a default rating category 
(which are KL, D and M) during the year, and then the sample is divided into five 
sub-groups. Panel A in Table 12 shows the average value of debt change 
calculated for each sub-group. The results do not support the debt overhang 
theory, as shown in Table 11. In fact, we found a positive relationship between 
leverage level and debt change, which is stronger as an MSME faces financial 
difficulty in paying its obligations to the bank. For the unweighted method, in the 
smallest class of financial distress, the debt change difference between the 
highest and lowest leverage is 0.14 and significant at 1%. Interestingly, this 
difference is not linear with financial distress, and it even forms a curve pattern, 
in which the debt change difference is high when the financial distress faced by 
the firm is lowest and highest and low between two extreme points of financial 
distress, which are 0.12, 0.10, 0.12 and 0.13, and all are significant at 1%. Based 
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on Panel A of Table 12, MSMEs experienced negative debt change when the 
current leverage was very low and positive when leverage was high. This 
indicates the positive behaviour of MSMEs that when leverage is low, they are 
motivated to pay off their debts. In contrast, when leverage is high and debt 
change is positive, it indicates two things. First, it indicates that an MSME is 
experiencing financial difficulties and it encourages the bank to inject new debt. 
Second, an MSME is focused on increasing its debt and utilising its leverage 
benefit. This second condition arises when business opportunities are abundant 
and the management is simultaneously in the best form in running the business 
and generating profit. Findings for the weighted method are almost the same, 
except with regard to the magnitude and curve pattern on the debt change 
differences between the highest and lowest leverage, which are 0.13, 0.07, 0.12, 
0.10 and 0.10, where all are significant at 1%. 
 
 
Panel B in Table 12 shows a positive relationship between leverage and 
firm growth. Firm growth is calculated as ROE multiplied by the retention rate, 
which is the portion of net income earned and reinvested in the current year. As 
young firms, all net income should be reinvested. However, many firms take out 
the net income for personal withdrawals. To control the personal withdrawal 
from internal funds, the sample includes only firms that reinvest all of their net 
income earned in the current year or for which the retention rate is 100%. The 
results support the findings in Panel A of Table 12 that a firm’s motivation to 
increase debt when leverage is high is driven by the firm’s focus on obtaining 
positive NPV projects and eventually increasing the firm’s profitability. Firm 
growth increases along with the increase in leverage and debt change. These 
findings also confirm that the debt overhang theory does not apply to MSMEs. In 
the unweighted method, the difference between the top and bottom groups of 
leverage levels tend to increase along with the increasing debt change, which are 
0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.04 and 0.10 with a significance level of 5%, 1%, 1%, 10% and 
1%, respectively. The same findings were also found in the weighted method 
except in terms of magnitude, the difference in the values of both groups, and 
their significance, namely 0.03, 0.05, 0.05, –0.00 and 0.05 with a significance of 
10%, 5%, 1%, not significant and 5%, respectively. 
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Table 11  
Relationship between leverage change and future investment 
 
Explanatory variables 
Y1 =  
investment rate 
Y2 =  
capital expenditure 
Y3 =  
delta net working capital 
DLEV 0.03 (0.08)  0.08 (0.07) 0.01 (0.03) 
ROE 0.12(0.07)* 0.07 (0.04)* 0.01 (0.02)* 
GPM –0.41(0.14)*** –0.09 (0.09)** –0.19 (0.06)*** 
BOPO 0.65 (0.22)*** 0.14 (0.13)** 0.27 (0.08)*** 
CASHFLOW 0.03 (0.06) –0.04 (0.03) 0.13 (0.03)*** 
CAPACITY –0.08 (0.04)* –0.00 (0.03)* –0.01 (0.02)* 
LEVERAGE –0.17 (0.05)*** –0.10 (0.03)*** 0.07 (0.03)** 
Constant 0.23 (0.03)*** 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.03 (0.01)** 
F-statistic 4.74*** 2.41** 10.40*** 
Ramsey RESET statistic 6.55** 3.15* 0.12 
  
Note: Debt overhang appears when there is a negative impact of debt change and future investment activities. 
Future investment is measured with three measures: investment rate, capital expenditure and delta net working 
capital. The investment rate is calculated as the percentage of total asset change in the current year. Capital 
expenditure and investment on working capital are weighted with total assets. The remainder of the variables 
use similar definitions as in section 3, except GPM, which is weighted with total assets. The model is estimated 
using OLS with White robust standard errors. The amount of available cross-sectional data is 3,450 
observations from 1,615 firms over 4 years (i.e., 2004–2007). The use of lagged variables causes 2,172 firms to 
be ineligible for inclusion in the dataset. The numbers in parentheses indicate the standard error. *** indicates 
significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10%. Goodness of fit is 
tested is using an F test and Ramsey RESET(1) test. H0 of the F test states that the coefficient of all variables 
included in the model simultaneously are zero. H0 of the Ramsey RESET(1) test states that the coefficients of 
the added variables are jointly zero. 
  
Findings in Panels A and B of Table 12 are also supported by Panel C of 
Table 12. Firm growth is sorted by the leverage level and internal funds provided 
from business operations. The results showed that firm growth increases with 
leverage and operating cash flow. In this context, an increase in leverage 
responded positively to the increase in cash flow, and this increase in cash flow is 
used effectively to enhance firm growth. That is the reason why MSMEs 
continue to increase their debt (the results are shown in Panel B) even though 
their debt accumulates rapidly. The differences in firm growth between the top 
and bottom groups of leverage are negative when operating cash flow is very 
low. Note that high leverage leads to large financial costs, lower operating cash 
flow would cause firm’s capital to be eroded, and accumulated internal funds are 
used to finance the operating expenses and financial costs, ultimately decreasing 
firm growth. The differences in firm growth between the top and bottom groups 
of leverage in the smallest group of internal funds is –0.02 and not significant for 
the unweighted method and –0.04 and significant at 5% for the weighted method. 
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Table 12 
Leverage effects on debt overhang, financial distress and firm growth 
 
 
 
 
Note:  The data consist of observations of 1,615 firms over 4 years (i.e., 2004–2007). Leverage is calculated as 
the ratio of debt to total assets. Financial distress is calculated as the total firms having financial problems in 
paying debt to bank each month for a year. The difficulties in payment are stated with ratings KL, D and M. Debt 
change as the measure of debt overhang is calculated as the percentage of debt changes in the current year. Firm 
growth (g) is calculated as g = ROE × retention rate. Refer to the MSME’s characteristics; the sample used 
includes firms that reinvested all of their net income. Internal funds are calculated from operating cash flow 
weighted by total assets. Debt capacity is measured using the proportion of collateralised assets (tangible fixed 
assets) to total assets. First, the sample is ranked based on the leverage level and grouped into five groups at the 
beginning of the year. Then, for each leverage group, the sample is ranked and grouped into five sub-groups 
based on financial distress (Panel A), debt change (Panel B), internal funds (Panel C), and debt capacity (Panel 
D). For each sub-group, the average debt change is calculated based on the availability of observations and may 
differ for each measure. T-test statistics are shown in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively.  
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Panel D of Table 12 confirms the relationship between leverage, debt 
overhang and debt capacity. The results showed that debt change increases along 
with the leverage level (consistent with Panel A) and the amount of debt capacity. 
In each group of leverage, debt change is positively related to debt capacity. As 
in Panel A, the relationship between leverage, debt overhang and debt capacity is 
not linear. Debt change is high when debt capacity is lowest (which is 0.14 for 
the unweighted method and 0.13 for the weighted method, and both are 
significant at 1%) or highest (which is 0.14 for the unweighted method and 0.10 
for weighted method, and both are significant at 1%) and decreases when 
between the highest and lowest debt capacity. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
As a model selection and monitoring system, the accuracy of the Logit and 
hazard rate models strongly depends on the validity and reliability of internal 
rating systems. As we discussed, MSMEs’ financial statements are unaudited, 
and their information is presumed to be opaque. Therefore, we should take care 
when taking any information from their financial statements, for example, when 
choosing earnings: gross profit, EBIT or net income. In this case, we should use 
gross profit or EBIT. First, these measures refer to a firm's core business. Second, 
financial manipulation is more difficult to perform. If it is performed, a bank 
could detect it easily. Third, even with the simplest form of accounting, these 
measures are easily obtained. Fourth, the values of these measures do not usually 
fluctuate across time and among peer groups. If gross profit or EBIT in some 
firms deviate too much from their peer groups, it could be presumed that 
fraudulence is present in financial reporting unless special events occur, such as a 
large expansion in fixed assets. Similar to gross profit and EBIT, banks can 
optimise information on working capital, short-term operating liabilities and 
tangible-fixed assets. 
 
From the Logit model, a bank may use profitability measures (i.e., gross 
profit margin), operation efficiency (i.e., the ratio of operating expenses to 
revenue), operating cash flow, a firm's capacity (i.e., portion of tangible-fixed 
assets to total assets) and leverage (i.e., ratio of total debts to total assets) as a 
predictor of MSMEs’ default a year ahead. Various robustness models have 
shown consistent results. In fact, the findings of the models complement each 
other. These findings also indicate that the internal rating system in banks truly 
reflect MSMEs’ financial conditions. 
 
 In managing businesses, entrepreneurs’ inability to deal with greater 
capacity will lead to a situation in which investment in tangible fixed assets is 
insufficient in order to significantly increase the operating cash flow. Moreover, 
rising business capacity only increases operating expenses and financial cost and 
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cannot increase revenue significantly, which will lead to decreased firm 
profitability. Naturally, it may occur when a firm is owned and managed solely 
by an entrepreneur. The firm’s organisational structure, internal control, and 
delegation of tasks and responsibilities have not been well established. An 
increase in production capacity should be followed positively by an increased 
intensity of marketing and sales activities. Because every management function 
such as finance, marketing, production, etc. is conducted independently, boosting 
a firm’s sales is limited. The focus of entrepreneurs becomes fragmented. At the 
same time, they should pursue targets in sales, production and profit margins to 
provide sufficient funds to repay their obligations. These situations are presumed 
to be major factors causing firms to be unable to optimise their additional 
capacity to increase earnings. 
 
Lastly, there is also a negative impact of capital structure policies (debt 
ratio) and investment (firm capacity) in the prior period to current firm 
performance (operating cash flow). In signalling theory, the increase in leverage 
should respond positively to the increase in future operating cash flow. The 
increase in leverage is often regarded as a positive signal of future firm 
performance. In the case of public firms, their stock prices would fall when this 
signal is not proven. For a bank as a creditor, this condition should be a negative 
signal that an MSME is not efficient in managing its business. Supposedly, 
investment in fixed assets could increase a firm's business capacity and will 
eventually increase operating cash flow. Because the effect is negative, firms are 
not ready to receive additional capacity. Additional operating expenses and 
financial costs generated are not fully offset by a significant increase in revenue. 
As a result, the gap will only lower a firm’s profitability and the availability of 
operating cash flows. 
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